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DIRECTOR AND AUDIT COMMITTEE
RESPONSIBILITIES RELATING TO PERQUISITES
CHARLES B. To M*
Certain personal benefits which are not directly related to job perform-
ance of management, generally referred to as "perquisites" or "perks",
have rather recently become the focus of attention by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and have been deemed to constitute remu-
neration. Thus, their receipt must be disclosed in proxy statements, regis-
tration statements, and various other documents filed with the SEC.' In
order to ensure the accuracy of the remuneration sections of those docu-
ments, registrants must establish effective procedures for monitoring man-
agement's use of company assets and other perks.
2
* Vice President and General Counsel, Arkansas Best Corp., Fort Smith, Arkansas. B.S.
(1968), J.D. (1975), Washington and Lee University. Member of the New York Bar.
See SEC Release No. 33-5856, 34-13872, 42 Fed. Reg. 43,058, 46,047 (1977), reprinted
in 2 Far. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) 23,019 [hereinafter cited as Perquisites Release]. The release
was aimed at ensuring full disclosure of all forms of management remuneration. See generally
Messmer, Disclosure of Management Remuneration Under the Federal Securities Laws, in
PLI, Tenth Annual Institute on Securities Regulation 145 (1978).
2 See text accompanying notes 105-11 infra. Since the receipt of perquisites may also
constitute income for purposes of § 61 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended (the
Code), corporations have become concerned in recent years as to how the deduction of a
perquisites-related expense under Code § 162 as an "ordinary and necessary" business ex-
pense can be preserved. Although there has been much discussion in tax literature, the efforts
of the Internal Revenue Service (Service) in the perquisites area have not received the exten-
sive press coverage which the SEC's efforts have attracted. The Service has certainly not been
oblivious to the issue, but the Fringe Benefits Act, Pub. L. No. 95-427, 92 Stat. 997 (1978),
contains a provision which forbids promulgation of new regulations on perks and other fringe
benefits before January 1, 1980. In the interim, it is contemplated that Congress will make a
detailed study of the issue.
Sections 162, 262 and 274 of the Code provide the basic statutory framework for the
deduction of perks. Under § 274(d), no deduction is allowed for any travel or entertainment
expenses unless the taxpayer substantiates the amount of the expenses, the time and place
of travel or entertainment, the business purpose, and the business relationship to the tax-
payer of the individual's entertainment. Section 274(d) was intended to override the rule
enunciated in Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930), which permitted a court
to approximate expenses where evidence indicated that expenses deductible under § 162 were
actually incurred. Section 1.274-5(c) of the Treasury Regulations establishes the rules for
substantiating a deduction under § 274.
A Discussion Draft of Proposed Regulations on Employee Fringe Benefits (Discussion
Draft) issued by the Treasury Department in September 1975, and since withdrawn, took an
incremental cost approach to valuing perquisites which is similar to the approach taken by
the SEC in a release issued in December 1978. See text accompanying notes 13-14 infra. For
example, the Discussion Draft took the position that due to the minimal incremental cost to
the corporation, "hitchhiking" a ride on a company plane would not constitute income to an
employee. In the present regulatory and administrative climate, however, it does not seem
unlikely that the Service's position on perquisites would differ in many respects from the
position set forth in the Discussion Draft; e.g., if an executive "hitches" a rid on an airplane,
it would not be too surprising if the Service adopted the position that he receives income in
the amount of commercial airline fare for an equivalent trip, either first class or coach,
depending upon the type of airplane.
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In August 1977, the SEC issued a release addressing the perquisities
problem (Perquisites Release)' which stated that disclosure of perquisites
was required in documents filed with the SEC under the Securities Act of
1933, as amended ('33 Act),4 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended ('34 Act) .5 An additional release was issued in February 1978
(Interpretive Release)6 which answered a number of questions which had
arisen regarding the Perquisites Release. Although the Perquisites Release
stated that the method of valuation should be that which management
deems most reasonable, 7 neither release provided a uniform standard for
valuing non-cash perquisites. The examples provided in the Interpretive
Release suggested that if a cost to the employer standard would result in
no disclosable value, a benefit to the employee standard should be utilized,
and vice versa.' In short, the SEC seemed to want it both ways
On the other hand, if a plane is used solely for personal purposes, relying upon President
Nixon's settlement on family use of government airplanes and the resultant imputation of
income in the amount of comparable first class commercial fare may be hazardous. The Nixon
family required extensive security which could only be obtained by flying on government
airplanes. Thus, it would have seemed unfair to impute income in the amount of a compara-
ble charter flight. In contrast, few executives and their families need such privacy and secu-
rity. Thus, the Service may assert that income has been received in an amount equivalent to
the charter value.
If the Service disallows a perk's deduction, a corporation may be able to reclassify the
expense as additional compensation to the individual concerned, but reclassification can raise
several problems. First, compensation must meet the test of reasonableness under § 162(a)(1).
Furthermore, if an expense is disallowed under § 274(a), which disallows deductions for
entertainment expenses not directly related to, or directly preceding or following a bona fide
business discussion, the expense cannot be reclassified as compensation. Section 274(e)(3) of
the Code and Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(f)(2) (iii)(a) indicate that a taxpayer must treat expenses
related to goods, services and facilities as compensation on its income tax return as originally
filed, and that no reclassification will be permitted. Thus, it is quite likely that if a corpora-
tion treats the use of an airplane as a nonremunerative expense and the deduction is disal-
lowed under § 274(a) as not being business related, the corporation would not be permitted
to reclassify the deduction as compensation and would therefore lose the deduction.
For a more thorough discussion of the tax treatment of perquisites, see Executive
"Perks": the Emerging Tax, SEC and Withholding Principles, 2 J. OF CoRP. COUNSEL SEcrON,
STATE BAR OF TEXAS 1 (1979).
Perquisites Release, supra note 1.
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976).
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
SEC Release No. 33-5904, 34-14445, 43 Fed. Reg. 6,060 (1978), reprinted in 2 FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 23,019A [hereinafter cited as Interpretive Release].
Perquisites Release, supra note 1, 23,019 at 17,059-6 to 17,059-7.
Interpretive Release, supra note 6, 23,019A at 17,059-10. The response to Question 7
regarding the valuation of nonmonetary remuneration also recognized as reasonable valuation
methods appraisals, the value assigned by the registrant or executive for tax purposes, or
some other standard considered reasonable by management. Id. If the remuneration entailed
personal use of company assets, such as planes, apartments, and lodges, the SEC required
valuation by one of two methods: (1) the recipient's cost if he had obtained the use of
equivalent assets independent of the corporation; or (2) allocation to the individual of a
portion of the corporation's cost of owning and maintaining the facility on the basis of the
amount of personal usage, unless such amount was disproportionate to the amount the recipi-




A release published in late July 1978 proposed amendments' to the
management remuneration section of Regulation S-K," but was similarly
equivocal as to the valuation of non-cash perquisites.' 2 However, the re-
lease which finally adopted the amendments to the remuneration section
of Regulation S-K (Remuneration Release)'3 provides significant guidance
and specifies a qualified incremental cost approach to valuing perquis-
ites.'4
I. BACKGROUND OF THE PERKS PROBLEM
The SEC's relatively recent attention to the perquisites issue appears
to have been generated in part by concern arising out of the revelations
relating to corporate payoffs and kickbacks, such as those involving Gulf
Oil Corporation.' 5 In addition, the SEC has intensified its serutiny of per-
quisites in response to the discovery of the receipt by corporate officers of
substantial amounts of corporate funds for personal use without disclosure
in SEC filings.'" Except in cases of exceptional abuse of perquisites alleg-
I See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra. For example, Question 15 in the Interpretive
Release concerned the valuation of personal use of a company car. The Interpretive Release
stqted that the cost to the company should be used when an employee utilized a company
car to commute, despite the fact that the monetary benefit to the employee may only have
been the cost of public transportation. See Interpretive Release, supra note 6, 23,019A at
17,059-11. On the other hand, the response to a subsequent question stated that the cost to
the employee of a commercial airplane ticket should be utilized if an employee "hitched ' a
ride on a company aircraft which had available seats, even though the incremental cost to
the company was minimal. See id. (Question 19).
"* SEC Release No. 33-5950, 34-15007, 43 Fed. Reg. 34,415 (1978), reprinted in [Current]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,650 [hereinafter cited as Proposed Amendments Release].
" 17 C.F.R. Part 229 (1978), amended at 43 Fed. Reg. 34,402 & 58,181 (1978), reprinted
in 4 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 70,950-64.
1 See Proposed Amendments Release, supra note 10, 81,650 at 80,627.
" SEC Release No. 33-6003, 34-15,380, 43 Fed. Reg. 58,181 (1978), reprinted in
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,765 [hereinafter cited as Remuneration Release].
" The SEC's incremental cost approach to the valuation of perquisites is not unlike the
approach taken by the Treasury Department in the Discussion Draft. See note 2 supra.
,1 See SEC v. Gulf Oil Corp. Report of the Special Review Comm. of the Bd. of Directors
of Gulf Oil Corp., No. 75-0324 (D.D.C. 1975); Proposed Amendments to the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934: Hearings on S.3133 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking Housing &
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-7 (1976) (statement of John J. McCloy); SECURmES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND
PRACTICES, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Exhibit B at B-7 to B-9 (Senate Banking, Housing & Urban
Affairs Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as SEC CoRPORATE PAYMENTS REPORT].
" See, e.g., SEC v. Five Star Coal Co., No. C-2-77-832 (S.D. Ohio, filed Nov. 3, 1977),
13 S.E.C. Docket No. 9, at.633 (misappropriation of corporate assets by directors to create
shell corporation); SEC v. Sharon Steel Corp., No. 77-1631 (D.D.C., filed Sept. 20, 1977), 13
S.E.C. Docket No. 3, at 178; SEC v. Basic Food Indus., No. 77-1587 (D.D.C., filed Sept. 15,
1977), 13 S.E.C. Docket No. 2, at 105 (undisclosed advance of $217,000 in corporate funds to
former chief executive for personal use); SEC v. Ormand Indus., Inc., No. 77-0790 (D.D.C.,
filed May 10, 1977), 12 S.E.C. Docket No. 4, at 415 (undisclosed appropriation of $250,000
by chief executive officer for personal use); SEC v. Kneapler, No. 77-969-JLK (S.D. Fla., filed
April 4, 1977), 11 S.E.C. Docket No. 19, at 2224 (undisclosed use of corporate funds to
renovate officer's residence); SEC v. Potter Instrument Co., No. 77-0394 (D.D.C., filed March
1979]
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edly involving violations of fiduciary duties,'7 however, it has not been
suggested that there is anything improper about the personal use by man-
agement of corporate assets, provided such use is properly accounted for
and disclosed.' Moreover, the SEC has indicated that certain perquisites
which are directly related to job performance, such as free parking, meals
at company facilities, and office furnishings, do not constitute remunera-
tion and need not be disclosed in SEC filings.'9 But the SEC does seem
to suggest that the receipt by management of perquisites which are unre-
lated to job performance may reflect upon the "quality" of management,
a factor the SEC validly deems material to shareholders.
The SEC's concern with the quality of management quite properly
comprehends the views and attitudes of management on matters such as
questionable business practices, including suspect corporate payments and
the willingness of management to utilize corporate property for personal
benefit."0 To the SEC, however, the qualitative factor does not seem to
include the amount of time management devotes to conducting the busi-
ness of a publicly held corporation, or the personal sacrifices officers must
make such as the willingness to travel on short notice, to work long hours,
or to forego vacations or other personal plans in the face of business emer-
gencies.2 1 Thus, while "quality" of management is material to investors,
and the receipt of perquisites bears upon this qualitative factor, the SEC
deems material only those factors which reflect unfavorably on manage-
ment and ignores many positive indicators of management quality. Such
one-sidedness distorts the use of perquisites as a form of management
remuneration.
Another factor contributing to the increasing emphasis upon perquis-
ites is the expanding conception of what is material to the "average pru-
dent investor. '22 Traditionally, the average prudent investor has been
viewed by the SEC solely in economic terms as being interested in infor-
mation which related to the current and future economic performance of
a corporation, including information which might affect his vote on a mat-
9, 1977), 11 S.E.C. Docket No. 15, at 1984 (undisclosed use of $100,000 of corporate funds by
chairman of the board to maintain yacht and home, and pay domestic servants); SEC v.
Emersons Ltd., No. 77-0808 (D.D.C., filed May 11, 1976), 9 S.E.C. Docket No. 12 at 667
(failure of director to disclose receipt of $9,000 of corporate funds to make home improve-
ments).
11 See, e.g., SEC v. Five Star Coal Co., No. C-2-77-832 (S.D. Ohio, filed Nov. 3, 1977),
13 S.E.C. Docket No. 9, at 633 (officers of Five Star looted tangible assets of Five Star's
corporate predecessor for personal benefit creating a shell corporation while fraudulently
engaging to sell unregistered and worthless Five Star stock through use of a materially false
and misleading balance sheet and inflated quotations).
18 See Perquisites Release, supra note 1, $ 23,019 at 17,059-3 to 17,059-7.
"1 Id.; see text accompanying notes 120-33 infra.
21 See SEC CORPORATE PAY ENTs REPORT, supra note 15, at 15, 30.
21 Mann, The Application of Federal Securities Laws to Corporate Perquisites, reprinted
in MANAGEMENT REMUNERATION: SEC AND TAX ASPECTS OF CORPORATE PERQUISrrEs (PLI 1978).
See Hewitt, Developing Concepts of Materiality and Disclosure, 32 Bus. LAW. 887, 892-
99 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hewitt].
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ter placed before shareholders.' The courts, as indicated by the Supreme
Court's decision in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,24 have not sub-
scribed to such an expansive view of what information the average prudent
investor is interested in obtaining and what information he considers mate-
rial to his decision-making. In TSC, the Supreme Court established a
standard of materiality under section 14(a) of the '34 Act,2 and Rule 14a-
928 promulgated thereunder, directed to the economic interests of the aver-
age investor. The Court held that for information to be material to an
investor, there must be "a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under
all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual signifi-
cance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder."' 2 The TSC cir-
cuit court's definition of a material fact as one that "a reasonable share-
holder might consider important,"s' while responsive to the SEC's tradi-
tional economic view of the shareholder," was rejected by the Supreme
Court "as setting too low a threshold for the imposition of liability under
Rule 14a-9."10 Although the judicial standard of materiality is narrower
than that preferred by the SEC, materiality still requires evaluation of
management's judgment within the total context of the corporation's busi-
ness and financial circumstances .
3
Rule 12b-2, 2 promulgated under section 12 of the '34 Act,:" defines
a SEC ADvsoRy COM., 95th Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT ON CORP. DisLosuRE 326-27
(House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Comm. Print 1977), digested at [1977-1978 Trans-
fer Binder] Fa. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 81,357 (hereinafter cited as ADvIsORY CoMMrrrEz
REPoirT.
2, 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
" 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1978).
' 426 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added). One commentator has suggested that judicial impe-
tus towards expanded disclosure was provided by decisions such as Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974), which referred to the "ethical
investor" as being the focus of disclosure requirements. Id. at 700; see Hewitt, supia note 22,
at 897. This represents an expansion of the materiality concept to include special "ethical"
concerns such as the environment or civil rights, and is well beyond the informational require-
ments of the traditional average prudent investor who is interested primarily, if not solely,
in the return on his investment. Although decisions of this type may have influenced the
SEC's approach, the Supreme Court's TSC decision indicates that the more traditional and
less subjective materiality concept will continue to be applied by the courts absent a contrary
statutory mandate. Indeed, the TSC Court spoke of the "reasonable shareholder" and placed
no gloss upon this construction which indicated any change in the traditional concept. See
426 U.S. at 449-50.
Is Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 324, 330 (7th Cir. 1975) (emphasis
added).
" See text accompanying note 23 supra.
1 426 U.S. at 445, 449. The SEC filed a brief as amicus curiae urging affirmance of the
circuit court's "might consider important" standard of materiality for the average investor
Id. at 440.
11 TSC has been followed in subsequent lower court decisions. E.g., Goldberg v. Meridor,
567 F.2d 209, 218-19 (2dCir. 1977); Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d.1033, 1040
(7th Cir. 1977); Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 546 F.2d 1252, 1253 (5th Cir. 1977); Walsh v.
Butcher & Sherrerd, 452 F. Supp. 80, 83 (E.D. Pa. 1978); see Proxy Solicitation, 1977-1978
Securities Law Developments, 35 WASH. & LEE. L. Rav. 867, 871-83 (1978).
= 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1978).
1979]
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"material" in language similar to that of the TSC Court as limiting "the
information [to be disclosed] to those matters as to which an average
prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before buying or selling
the security registered. '3 Rule 12b-2 notwithstanding, the SEC's current
concept of what is material appears to be significantly broader than what
many average prudent investors consider material." Thus, information
formerly thought to be disclosable at management's discretion and imma-
terial to shareholders now is subject to disclosure under the new perquisites
guidelines.36
Certainly, cases of exceptional abuse of perquisites which were uncov-
ered under existing antifraud and disclosure provisions were material in
the traditional sense. 31 In all likelihood, those abuses also constituted a
waste of corporate assets under the pertinent state corporation laws. Under
the SEC's current concept of materiality, however, perquisites disclosure
will be more wide-ranging than traditional concepts of materiality would
require.3
The SEC Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure stated in its
report that "[i]f the [SEC] sees the need to directly regulate corporate
conduct, it should request Congress to authorize it to do so and should not
do so through requiring disclosure of immaterial information."39 Such au-
thorization is provided in the perquisites area by the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA),40 which was enacted a little more than a
- 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1976).
u 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2(j) (1978). Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(1) (1978), promulgated
under § 8 of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1976), defines "material" in language essentially
the same as Rule 12b-2. One commentator asks whether disclosure of information of which
an average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed as Rules 12b-2 and 405 require,
is the same standard of materiality as the TSC Court's required disclosure of information
where there is a substantial likelihood that the omitted fact would be significant in the
deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. See Hewitt, supra note 22, at 911. The question
is not answered.
" Hewitt, supra note 22, at 911-47. Indeed, comments were even requested on the advisa-
bility of requiring disclosure of the cost of maintaining the office of the chief executive,
including staff and such items as special furnishings. See Proposed Amendments Release,
supra note 10, 81,650 at 80,629.
1, See Remuneration Release, supra note 13; Proposed Amendments Release, supra note
10; Interpretive Release, supra note 6; Perquisites Release, supra note 1.
- See Kripke, Where Are We on Securities Disclosure After the Advisory Committee
Report?, 6 SEC. REG. L.J. 99, 122 n.61 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Kripke].
3 See ADvisoRY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 23, at 322-27.
Id. at 319 (footnote omitted).
, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, Title I (1977) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. §§
78m(b)(2), (3)(A), (B), 78dd-1 & -2). The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was en-
acted to proscribe corrupt corporate foreign practices, but it nevertheless applies to personal
benefits received by management. See Proposed Amendments Release, supra note 10,
81,650 at 80,627 n.8 ("A registrant's inability to identify large amounts of benefits may
raise questions under [the FCPA]."); cf. von Mehren, Introduction to Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: Law, Procedures and Practices, reprinted in PLI, TEm ANNUAL INsTrTu'r
ON S.cuRmFs RFGULATON 81, 87, 90 (1978) [hereinafter cited as von Mehrenl ("deplor-
able" that legislation considered largely as dealing with foreign payments may have its most
critical impact on internal corporate governance). For a discussion of the FCPA, see text
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month after issuance of the Advisory Committee Report. Section 102 of the
FCPA'1 amended section 13(b) of the '3a Act 42 on reporting requirements.
Section 102 applies to all issuers within the SEC's jurisdiction and not just
those issuers with foreign sales or operations.43 The amendment requires
issuers to maintain books, records, and accounts which "in reasonable
detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the
assets of the issuer."4 Each issuer is also required to maintain internal
accounting controls which provide "reasonable assurances" that transac-
tions are executed and access to assets is permitted only in accordance with
management procedures. Such transactions must be recorded in a manner
which will maintain accountability, and inventories and reconciliations
must be undertaken at reasonable intervals. 5 Thus, corporate assets used
to provide non-job related perquisites must be recorded since the disposi-
tion of those assets is material, if only for purposes of the FCPA.46
Even prior to enactment of the FCPA, however, the SEC issued the
Perquisites Release, perhaps on the theory, as stated in a speech by Com-
missioner Roberta S. Karmel, that
[c]orporate social responsibility may be an index to the quality
of management and viability of the enterprise . . . .Additional
information about management's perquisites may be material to
an evaluation of the quality and integrity of management ....
The fact that this is an issue at all, however, reflects on the evolu-
tion of the concept of materiality away from an objective standard
towards a more qualitative but, I hope, relevant standard. 7
The SEC Division of Enforcement has thus far concentrated on signifi-
cant failures to disclose perquisites which have been so egregious as to
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty to shareholders.48 One can expect,
however, that as the more serious cases in the perquisites area are dealt
with and because of the sweeping nature of the amendments to Item 4 of
Regulation S-K regarding management remuneration, 9 the Enforcement
Division will look toward less serious offenders.
Private rights of action also exist under section 11 of the '33 Acts and
accompanying notes 113-19 infra. The SEC has issued very broad final regulations con-
cerning the FCPA. See note 149 infra.
1' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 102; 91 Stat. 1494, Title 1 (1977)
(to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2), (3)(A), (B)).
42 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (1976).




11 See text accompanying notes 113-19 infra.
' "Changing Concepts of Materiality," Speech by SEC Commissioner Roberta S. Kar-
mel to the New York Chapter of the National Investor Relations Institute (April 12, 1978).
See cases cited iii note 16 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 120-43 infra.
15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
1979]
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section 14 of the '34 Act' for failure to include information required to be
disclosed by the SEC's forms. In addition, it has been argued that since
the remuneration table in a proxy statement is a material fact, any error
in the table may cause a proxy statement to be false and misleading,
thereby resulting in a violation of Rule 14a-9.52 Absent a situation of
serious abuse, however, failure to disclose the amount and nature of
perquisites would be of little or no materiality in the more traditional
sense. Thus, a private action or an administrative or injunctive proceed-
ing by the SEC for failure to include required information in the relevant
forms probably would result in only minimal monetary damages, coupled
with the public embarrassment of a settlement or consent decree requir-
ing amendment of the form in question and the establishment of perquis-
ites monitoring procedures.
II. PERQUISITES MONITORING AND CONTROL
The SEC's efforts in the perquisites area thus far have not met with
universal acclaim, in part because of the departure from the more tradi-
tional materiality concept. The amount of time, both corporate and gov-
ernmental, that has been devoted to perquisites which traditionally would
have been considered nonabusive in nature and immaterial has been
strongly criticized. One well-known commentator has stated that
"[sitretching these [materiality] requirements by interpretation pro-
vided a sensation for a while, but left behind a detritus of useless
'disclosures' containing no meaningful information. '53 He further contends
that the SEC's powers to institute fraud actions are sufficient to provide a
remedy when abuse of perquisites occurs.54 Nevertheless, it is clear that the
SEC expects registrants to establish effective perquisites monitoring pro-
grams.
A. Role of the Board of Directors
The board of directors traditionally has been viewed as being responsi-
ble for the management of the corporation." This view is reflected in most
state corporation laws, which generally speak in terms of an active man-
agement role for directors." At least two factors, however, prevent a board
2, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976); see General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159,
161 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1968).
52 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1978). Rule 14a-9 prohibits solicitation by a proxy which con-
tains "any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it
is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any
material fact. . . ." Id.
m Kripke, supra note 37, at 122 n.61. Instead of dabbling with moralistic concepts of
materiality and crusading to uncover "perks," Kripke would have the SEC "encourage re-
search that might help to determine the relationship between changes in macroeconomic
factors and security prices." Id. at 122.
' Id. at 122 n.61; see text accompanying note 37 supra.
See generally Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate Control, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 22 (1963);
Berle, Control in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. Rav. 1212 (1958).
m See, e.g., DEL. CoDE tit. 8, § 141(a) (Supp. 1978); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.33 (Supp.
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of directors, which includes outside directors, from managing a large corpo-
ration on a day-to-day basis. The first factor is time constraints. The
second is the practical inability of outside directors to obtain and review
.necessary information." Since directors know that it is impossible to main-
tain the active role suggested by the legal model because of time and
information constraints, the role directors are expected to assume in moni-
toring perquisites is uncertain.5
Prior to 1975, most commentators advocated providing a mechanism
whereby directors would actually "manage" the corporation, thus bringing
actual director conduct into line with the statutory.requirements. Propos-
als were made to have professional directors serve on several boards,59 to
have full-time directors,"0 and to have corporate boards with their own
staffs." However, each of these proposals had significant drawbacks.
62
More recently, commentators have concentrated on the functions which a
board can meaningfully perform given the time, information, and other
constraints which exist." One commentator has even stated that in reality
corporate boards function best not as policy makers but as monitors, and
that the monitoring function should be considered the primary function of
the board of directors.
6 4
1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 701 (McKinney Supp.-1978).
Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Offi-
cers, Directors and Accountants, 63 CAL. L. REv. 375, 378-84 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Eisenberg].
See generally Soderquist, Toward A More Effective Corporate Board: Reexamining
Roles of Outside Directors, 52 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1341, 1357-63 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Soderquist].
-1 See, e.g., W. DOUGLAS, DEmocRAcY AND FNANCE 52-55 (1940); P. Holden, L. Fish and
H. Smith, Top MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL 225 (enlarged ed. 1948); J. JuRA &
J. LoUDEN, THE CORPORATE DiRECTOR 331-33 (1966).
"See generally C. BROWN & E. SMrnH, Tim DIRECTOR LOOKS AT HIS JOB 57-93 (1957).
" See, e.g., H. KooNTz, THE BOARD OF DmacroRs AND EFFECrIvE MANAGEMENT 169-70
(1967); Goldberg, Debate on Outside Directors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1972, § 3, at 1, col. 3.
0 See Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 385-90. Professional directors were not desired by a
large majority of corporations surveyed on the matter. Id. at 385. It is also doubtful whether
there is a sufficient number of qualified individuals to serve as professional directors. Id. at
386. Moreover, because directors' fees are relatively low, a professional director would need
to hold around a dozen seats in order to earn a living. This would generate enormous conflict
of interest problems as well as linking many major corporations together. Id. at 386-87.
A full-time director is an individual who is in a corporation's employ on a full-time basis,
but who has no operating responsibilities. Id. at 387. The distinction between operating and
nonoperating responsibilities is blurred, and most corporations could not easily develop or
afford a complete set of full-time managers with no operating responsibilities. Id. at 388. In
addition, many nonoperating functions cannot be isolated from operating decisions. Id.
Equipping the board with a substantial staff to advise it in reviewing management
output and proposals is equally flawed. Essentially a:shadow staff would be created with an
obligation to second-guess management, but with limited responsibility for results. Id. at 390.
Adding a staff to the board would create a further and unnecessary level of decision-making
and would increase the already burgeoning corporate bureaucracy. Responsibility.would be
diffused and, correspondingly, decision-making would be made increasingly difficult. Id.
13 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 391-403; Soderquist, supra note 58, at 1357-63.
" Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 396-403, 438; see M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE
CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYsis 162-70 (1976).
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The 1974 amendments to section 141 of the Delaware General Corpora-
tion Law 5 explicitly recognize that directors have been constrained from
actively managing the corporation as dictated by the legal model. Section
141(a) states in pertinent part that the "business and affairs of every
corporation. . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors." 8 The words "or under the direction of" were added to eliminate
any implication that directors must become involved in the day-to-day
management of a corporation and were intended to indicate that a board
can function as a monitor instead of a managing body."7 Nevertheless, the
additional language does little to aid a director in ascertaining what his
duties are."
Partly as a result of the uncertainty concerning the duties of directors
and because damages can be extremely large, state courts have been reluc-
tant to impose liability when a director's conduct has been merely negli-
gent.6" Directors of banks and other financial institutions, however, have
generally been held to higher standards of care than directors of industrial
corporations.0 In determining the liability of directors of industrial corpo-
rations, state courts have applied the business judgment rule when ordi-
nary negligence absent wrongdoing existed,7 and self-dealing has usually
been present when liability has been imposed. 2 Reluctance to impose lia-
bility also appears to stem from a belief that if excessive demands are
placed upon outside directors, securing the services of able and experi-
enced corporate directors would be extremely difficult.
7 3
Whether state courts will continue to be reluctant to impose liability
remains to be seen, but it seems unlikely that directors would be held liable
'7 DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(a) (Supp. 1978).
68 Id.
17 See Soderquist, supra note 58, at 1361 n.122; ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 35
(rev. ed. 1974).
" Vagts, Directors: Myth and Reality, 31 Bus. LAw. 1227, 1230 (1976); see Soderquist,
supra note 58, at 1361.
11 Cohen, Philosophy of Board Activity and Responsibility, reprinted in PLI, DUms AND
RESPONSIBILITIES OF OUTSIDE DiwCTORs 233, 239 (A. Cohen & R. Loeb eds. 1978).
10 E.g., Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
" See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); Warshaw v.
Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (1966); Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625,
642-43 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Smith v. Brown-Borhek Co., 414 Pa. 325, 200 A.2d 398, 398-402 (1964).
Under the business judgment rule:
acts of directors, within the powers of the corporation, in the furtherance of its
business, made in good faith and in the exercise of an honest judgment, are valid
and conclude the corporation and its shareholders. Questions of management pol-
icy, contract expediency and adequate consideration are left to their honest and
unselfish decision, judgment and discretion and may not be interfered with or
restrained.
Heimann v. American Express Co., 53 Misc. 2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 867, 881 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
72 See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971); Sterling v. Mayflower
Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952); Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends
in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968);
Soderquist, supra note 58, at 1348.
1 Smith v. Brown-Borhek Co., 414 Pa. 325, 333, 200 A.2d 398, 401 (1964).
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under state law for failure to establish a perquisite monitoring program,
except in cases of extreme abuse constituting a waste of corporate assets.
There is no doubt, however, that directors are increasingly aware of their
growing exposure to liability of all types.74
Liability can be imposed on directors for misconduct such as failure to
exercise the functions and duties of their office. Current concepts of direc-
tor functions include providing advice and counsel to the chief executive
of the corporation, serving as a constraining force on the activities of man-
agement, authorizing major corporate action, representing the views of
nonmanagement individuals in corporate decisionmaking, selecting senior
management and evaluating its performance, and acting in crisis situa-
tions." In short, as one commentator has stated, "the ineradicable and
unavoidable responsibility of directors is to see that management is doing
its job."7 6
The SEC recognizes that outside directors are not involved in the day-
to-day affairs of the corporations they direct and are not expected to par-
ticipate in the implementation of corporate policies.7 Nevertheless, several
recent cases clearly indicate that directors cannot assume a wholly passive
role in the direction of a corporation, especially in connection with public
offerings and proxy statements. 8 One court has stated that "[w]hen pos-
sible, the liability sections [of the '33 and '34 Acts] should be interpreted
to afford incentives to directors to undertake active and rigorous scrutiny
of corporate activities . . .
The SEC's concept of directors' duties can be ascertained from its
Report of Investigation in the Matter of Stirling Homex Corp. Relating to
" Cf. Hershman, Opening Remarks, 27 Bus. LAw 1, 2-4 (Feb. 1972 Special Issue: Officers'
and Directors' Responsibilities and Liabilities) (outlining substantial increase in suits
brought against officers and directors and in resulting liability).
71 See J. BACON, CORPORATE DmECroRsmp PRACccEs 93-107 (1967); M. MACE, DIREarORs:
MYTH AND REn.xrY 14, 23, 27 (1971).
11 Gibson, Functions of Directors Under the Existing System, 27 Bus. LAW 23, 45 (Feb.
1972 Special Issue: Officers' and Directors' Responsibilities and Liabilities).
17 See Lanza v. Drexell & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (quoting brief
for SEC as amicus curiae at 5).
II In Lanza v. Drexell & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973), the court noted that although
proof of a willful or reckless disregard for the truth is necessary to establish director liability
under Rule lOb-5, a director may have an obligation to maintain an awareness of significant
corporate developments and to consider any material, adverse developments which come to
his attention. Id. at 1306; cf. Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 858-
65 (D. Del. 1972) (under negligence standard which governs liability with respect to proxy
solicitation under the '34 Act, a director who participates in a proxy solicitation which utilizes
materially false or misleading statements violates § 14a of the Act if he knew or should have
known of the improper disclosure); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 687-
89 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (outside director has duty to investigate accuracy of prospectus, must use
reasonable care to investigate facts which a prudent man would employ in the mangement
of his own property). But see Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (Hand, J.)
(unreasonable to require directors to read materials circulated to shareholders for factual
accuracy since such a requirement is the duty of management).
71 Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 859 (D. Del. 1972).
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Activities of the Board of Directors of Stirling Homex Corp.8° (Stirling
Homex Report), and from the complaint filed in SEC v. Shiell8 The SEC
stated in the Stirling Homex Report that it was not promulgating any
guidelines relating to the duties of outside directors." Despite this dis-
claimer, the report is highly instructive. The report arose out of a situation
in which outside directors assumed no "significant role in the direction of
a company's affairs even though they possessed considerable business ex-
perience and sophistication."' 3
The SEC indicated that major corporate decisions should not be left
solely to the executive committee of the board of directors.," This appears
to contradict the law of Delaware and other states which permit reliance
upon committees of the board.s However, the Stirling Homex board placed
virtually absolute, unquestioning reliance upon the executive committee,
which was comprised solely of management directors.8 Indeed, the SEC
criticized the lack of other committees to aid the board and the absence
of written agenda and memoranda to assist the board in its deliberations:
The Board of Directors did not create any other committees to
assist in the performance of its responsibilities or to receive, solicit
or evaluate information from Stirling Homex management. There
was no presentation of a written agenda containing items for dis-
cussion at any Board meetings, or memoranda which would have
0 [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,219 [hereinafter cited as
Stirling Homex Report]; see Cohen, The Outside Director-Selection, Responsibilities, and
Contribution to the Public Corporation, 34 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 837, 843 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Cohen].
"' [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,190; see 383 SEC. REG. &
L. REP. (BNA) A-8 (Dec. 22, 1976) (background and summary of complaint) [hereinafter
cited as Shiell]; Cohen, supra note 80, at 843-47.
" Stirling Homex Report, supra note 80, 80,219 at 85,462.
" Id. Stirling Homex was engaged in the manufacture and installation of modular
homes. Id. at 85,460. In 1970, after completion of an initial public offering of $20 million of
common stock, the Stirling Homex management began a fraudulent course of conduct de-
signed to show continually increasing sales and earnings through the recordation of fictitious
sales, earnings, and assets. Id. As part of this fraudulent conduct, materially false and mis-
leading registration statements, press releases, annual and periodic reports, and other materi-
als were filed with the SEC and released to the public and stockholders of Stirling Homex.
Id. In early 1971, Stirling Homex again decided to publicly offer $20 million of securities
because the corporation was encountering cash flow problems. Id. Subsequent to this offering,
the financial condition of Stirling Homex deteriorated and the corporation ultimately filed a
Chapter X petition for reorganization in 1972. Id. The outside directors of Stirling Homex
were intentionally deceived by corporate officers and inside directors as to the fraudulent
course of conduct pursued by managment through misrepresentations, falsified contracts,
and false and misleading financial information. Id. at 85,459. Nevertheless, the SEC criti-
cized the outside directors because they relied primarily on management for information and
accepted information without question, failed to obtain a sufficient understanding of the
company's accounting practices in order to make informed decisions, and essentially did little
more than fill chairs at board meetings. Id. at 85,462-63.
' See Stirling Homex Report, supra note 80, 80,219 at 85,460.
" See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(c) (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 712(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1978); TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr. ANN. art. 2.36 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
49 Stirling Homex Report, supra note 80, 80,219 at 85,460, 85,462-63.
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assisted the Board in considering various proposals and opera-
tional problems in an orderly and businesslike manner.87
The Commission was also critical of the outside directors' failure to
familiarize themselves with accounting practices.m As a result, the outside
directors were unable to discover abuses which might arise. Their failure
to ask probing questions and their willingness to be satisfied with super-
ficial answers to those questions which were asked were also noted."9
In Shiell, the SEC again objected to a lack of director control over
corporate management. The complaint alleged the failure of board mem-
bers to supervise sufficiently the officers and operations of the company
and failure to inquire into business activites when "they knew or should
have known" of the company's deteriorating financial position. 0 The direc-
tors were charged with"unwarranted reliance" upon the representations of
the company's president as the sole source of information regarding the
company's operations, failure to meet with other officers, failure to estab-
lish reporting requirements, failure to inquire adequately into the affairs
of the company and failure to review the unconsolidated audited and unau-
dited statements of the company and its subsidiaries, which would have
revealed a number of problems."
The Stirling Homex Report and Shiell clearly indicate that the Com-
mission expects outside directors to question management and outside
auditors in a thorough and probing manner.9 2 Indeed, the Stirling Homex
" Id. at 85,460.
m Id. at 85,462-63.
u Id. at 85,460-61, 85,463.
" Shiell, supra note 81, at A-9; see Cohen, supra note 80, at 846-47. TCC business
activities, until 1971, consisted of originating and funding VA and FHA residential and
commercial mortgage loans for later sale to institutional investors, and servicing the loans.
Shiell, supra note 81, at A-8. With the coming of the building boom in the early 1970's, TCC
shifted its activities to land acquisition, development and construction loans, which it also
sold to institutional investors. Id. High demand by institutional investors for these mortgages
led the company to do business with marginal developers and to finance ill-conceived pro-
jects. Id. In 1974, the energy crisis, inflation and recession made it increasingly difficult for
many builders to meet their commitments. Id. Much of TCC's expansion into construction
and development was financed through the sale of short term investment certificates. Id. In
1974 TCC's officers, in need of money to pay off certificates as they became due and to finance
company operations, made a public offering of more cerfificates and common stock after
engaging in several questionable transactions to make the company appear healthy. Id. The
prospectus issued in connection with the public offering failed to disclose that TCC utilized
questionable business practices to obtain additional cash to enable builders to complete their
projects and avoid default. Id. at A-9. The prospectus also did not disclose that material
amounts of the company's outstanding loans were in default and that TCC engaged in sham
transactions to enhance artifically its financial condition. Id. There were misrepresentations
in the prospectus as well, such as statements that the company's loan experience was highly
successful, that no losses had been realized on construction loans, and that the directors were
exercising proper control over management. Id. The SEC brought suit against TCC seeking
an injunction against various officers, directors, and its accountant. Cohen, supra note 80, at
843. All defendants except two consented to the entry of a permanent injunction against
them. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,190 at 92,384.
" Shiell, supra note 81, at A-9 to A-10; see Cohen, supra note 80, at 844-47.
'= See Cohen, supra note 80, at 847.
19791
96 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Report has been characterized as coming "dangerously close" to placing
outside directors in an adversarial relationship with inside directors.9 In
short, it appears that the SEC may at least in part subscribe to the follow-
ing position:
There is an iron paradox which governs corporate affairs, and no
amount of restructuring can entirely avoid its force: Only those
who are involved in an enterprise full-time have sufficient knowl-
edge to direct an enterprise, while only those who are not involved
full-time can be trusted to monitor those who direct."
In any event, there is no doubt that the SEC expects directors to assume
an active monitoring role. In the perquisites area, as well as in many other
areas, the primary responsibility for monitoring could be assigned to the
audit committee, or to a committee which would perform similar functions
such as the compensation committee.
B. Role of the Audit Committee
In contrast to the executive committee which in many respects is a
substitute for the full board of directors, the audit committee's function is
investigatory and advisory. The audit committee is designed to provide
facts and advice to the board of directors in order to permit the board to
analyze the company's operations more effectively. 5 An indication of the
importance which the SEC attaches to audit committees is the number of
consent settlements which have created or continued audit committees."
Under the Audit Committee Policy of the New York Stock Exchange 7
(Exchange) each domestic company listed on the Exchange was required
to establish an audit committee comprised solely of directors independent
of management no later than June 30, 1978. Other than the Exchange
requirement that the committee be comprised solely of outside indepen-
dent directors, no regulations or statutes have been adopted by the Ex-
change, the SEC, or Congress relating to the duties of audit committees.
However, in a July 1978 release addressing corporate governance issues,
the SEC proposed that all issuers be required to disclose whether or not
they utilized an audit committee and, if so, what the functions and duties
13 Shipman, Role of Outside Director Distinguished From That Of Inside Director,
reprinted in PLI, DuTms AD RESPONSmmmEs OF OuTsmE DmEcroRs 54, 62 (A. Cohen & R.
Loeb eds. 1978).
" Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 439.
" Solomon, The Audit Committee: Its Growing Significance in the Corporate Structure,
42 CPA J. 578, 580 (1972).
" See, e.g., SEC v. Killearn Properties, Inc. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
RaP. (CCH) 96,256 (N.D. Fla. 1977); SEC v. Mattel, Inc. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,807 (D.D.C. 1974); SEC v. Lum's, Inc. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,504 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); SEC v. Coastal States Gas Corp., SEC
Litigation Release No. 6054 (S.D. Tex. 1973). For duties of audit committees, see text accom-
panying notes 100-02 infra.
"2 NYSE GumE (CCH) 2495H.
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of the committee were. 8 The proposal was adopted in the final release
which was issued December 4, 1978.11 The SEC listed audit committee
duties in the July release which included engaging and discharging the
independent auditors, reviewing the audit with the auditors, and inquiring
into the financial practices of the corporation.10 Several commentators
have suggested other duties such as review of the intended scope of the
annul independent audit, determination that accounting standards are
being met and review of "inside audits" conducted by management.''
In the Perquisites Release, the SEC noted "with approval" that some
corporations had established procedures by which independent auditors
reviewed management remuneration and reported the results of their re-
view to the audit or a similar committee, and that in other corporations,
the board of directors had assumed responsibility for approving or disap-
proving the aggregate remuneration of all or certain management mem-
bers.' 2 The SEC considers such procedures steps toward providing more
accurate data upon which disclosures relating to remuneration are made
11 SEC Release No. 34-14970, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,945 (1978), reprinted in [Current Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,645 at 80,579-80 [hereinafter cited as Proposed Corporate
Governance Release].
" SEC Release No. 34-15384, 43 Fed. Reg. 58,522 (1978), reprinted in [Current Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 81,766 at 81,093-95 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item
6(d)) [hereinfter cited as Adopted Corporate Governance Release].
'w Proposed Corporate Governance Release, supra note 98, 81,645 at 80,580. The SEC
believes that the following functions should be assumed by an effective audit committee:
(a) engaging and discharging auditors; (b) reviewing the engagement of the audi-
tors, including the fee, scope and timing of the audit and any other services ren-
dered; (c) reviewing with the auditors and management a company's policies and
procedures with respect to internal auditing, accounting and financial controls; (d)
reviewing with the independent auditors, upon completion of their audit, their
report or opinion, their perception of the company's financial and accounting per-
sonnel, the cooperation they received during the audit, the extent to which com-
pany resources were and should be used to minimize the time spent on the audit,
any significant transactions which are not a normal part of the company's business,
any change in accounting principles and practicies, all significant proposed adjust-
ments and any recommendations they may have for improving internal accounting
controls, choice of accounting principles, or management systems; (e) inquiring
concerning deviations from the issuer's code of conduct and periodically reviewing
such policies; (f) meeting with the company's financial staff at least twice a year
to discuss internal accounting and auditing procedures and the extent to which
recommendations made by the internal staff or by the independent auditors have
been implemented; and (g) reviewing significant press releases concerning financial
matters.
Id. at 80,580 n.21. The SEC has not actually adopted requirements relating to audit commit-
tee functions, although it has stated that the foregoing list provides "a convenient initial
reference for companies subject to the proxy rules .. "Adopted Corporate Governance
Release, supra note 99, 81,766 at 81,094-95.
- See Leech & Mundheim, The Outside Director of the Publicly Held Corporation, 31
Bus. LAw. 1799, 1815-16 (1976); Cohen, supra note 81, at 856-57. See generally Choka, The
New Role of the Audit Committee, 23 PRAC. LAw. 53 (1977); Note, Accounting-The Audit
Committee-A Progressive Move Toward More Meaningful Financial Reporting, 3 J. CORP.
L. 400 (1978).
M Perquisites Release, supra note 1, 23,019 at 17,059-7.
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and has urged registrants to analyze all procedures by which management
remuneration is identified and disclosed.'1 A recent congressional report
also focused on the role of audit committees and specifically stated that
the establishment of policies regarding management perquisites and the
monitoring and review of such policies are obligations of audit committees:
Corporate audit committees must become involved in review-
ing the propriety of special perquisites enjoyed by senior manage-
ment officials of some corporations. Audit committees should es-
tablish sound policies to prevent hidden remuneration of execu-
tives through use of corporate assets for housing, personal loans,
club memberships, and personal travel or pleasure. Independent
auditors should monitor compliance with such policies, and assure
that the amounts and types of all management compensation are
reported to shareholders and the public.' 4
C. Perquisites Monitoring and Reporting
The method of establishing a perquisites policy and a system for moni-
toring that policy is largely a matter requiring an accountant's expertise,
and many of the major accounting firms have made recommendations
relating to the management and reporting of perquisites which might con-
stitute remuneration. A general review of various materials"' suggests the
following means of formulating a perquisites policy:
1. The audit committee, with the assistance of management,
should identify the various types of benefits which are provided to
management for personal use but which are not directly related to
job performance, such as the use of automobiles, airplanes, apart-
ments, and recreational facilities, the receipt of loans and other
categories of perquisites. Corporate policy relating to use of the
items which constitute perquisites should be established and
should include any specific authorization necessary for use, dollar
limits upon use and valuation methods for use of corporate assets
deemed to constitute remuneration fok reporting purposes.
2. Control procedures should be established. Internal auditors,
and perhaps outside auditors, should be utilized to develop control
procedures. Their final form should be approved by the audit com-
mittee, and perhaps by the entire board. When a determination is
made that record-keeping would be excessively expensive or im-
practical with respect to certain benefits, there should be a state-
ment to that effect in the minutes of the audit committee.
10 Id.
I Senate Governmental Affairs Subcomm. on Reports, Accounting and Management,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., Report on Improving Accountability of Publicly-Held Corporations and
Their Auditors 14 (1977).
10 See generally Ernst & Ernst, Reporting Executive Perquisites (1978); Arthur Young,
A Closer Look at Executive Perquisites (Oct. 1977); Augenbraun, Review of Management
Perquisites, 11 Rxv. Sac. REG. 952, 953 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Augenbraun].
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3. Policies should also be established relating to dealings between
management and third parties, such as banks and suppliers with
which the corporation does business.' Management would have
the basic responsibility for administering the perquisites program
in accordance with the policies adopted by the board and the audit
committee, and should be required to report periodically to the
audit committee.
1 7
Establishing a perquisites program, however, will not provide absolute
insulation against perquisites litigation:
In an egregious case, proper authorization or recording would
not preclude successful legal attack grounded on corporate waste
or violation of disclosure requirements, assuming that the
[Perquisites] [R]elease's interpretation of those requirements is
upheld by the courts. But if the registrant's independent audit
committee had determined that the benefit was directly related to
job performance, that determination should presumably not be
subject to successful challenge."'
In addition, assuming that perquisites are maintained at the reasonable
level, a perquisites program which includes monitoring by both the audit
or other appropriate committee and outside auditors should provide rea-
sonable assurances of success in defending against any legal attack.
The audit committee also may find it beneficial to discuss audit results
with the outside auditors. In this manner, information which is not impor-
tant enough for inclusion in the auditors' opinion, but which should be
brought to the attention of the board, can be discussed with the committee
members. The audit committee then can report to the entire board on
those matters of greatest importance.' 9
In addition, in order to measure the effectiveness of a perquisites pro-
gram, it may be desirable for outside auditors to include the program in
the annual audit. As a result, the audit committee may be able to ascertain
the adequacy of the outside auditors' evaluation of the effectiveness of
internal controls, including the performance of internal auditors and meth-
10 A personal benefit received from a third party will not constitute remuneration from
a corporation if there is no incremental cost to the corporation. Eppler & Yeager,
Management Perquisites, 10 REV. SEC. REG. 841 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Eppler &
Yeager]; see text accompanying notes 134-41 infra. Absent an agreement by a registrant to
maintain or increase its accounts or compensating balance at a bank, or to undertake to
increase its borrowing or to pay a higher rate of interest as a result of loans to officers and
directors, or to purchase goods at a cost in excess of market, the SEC's response to Questions
38-42 of the Interpretive Release indicates that this area should present no problem. See
Interpretive Release, supra note 6, 23,019A at 17,059-14 to 17,059-15.
I" Augenbraun, supra note 105, at 953.
'a, Eppler & Yeager, supra note 106, at 844.
10 See notes 100-01 supra; cf. Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 432-33 (advocating establish-
ment of audit committees with authority to oversee accounting matters including exclusive
power tp nominate and recommend dismissal of corporation's accountant on behalf of board,
direct accountant's activities, and to set terms of his engagement).
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ods used to test internal controls. ' Since matters relating to perquisites
would not be deemed "material" in the traditional sense,"' outside audi-
tors normally would not review records relating to perquisites or compli-
ance with a perks program. Thus, if a review of perquisites records or the
monitoring of compliance with a perks program is desired, such an under-
standing should be set forth in the audit agreement with the outside audi-
tors.
D. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
As stated in one of the SEC's perquisites releases, "accurate and suffi-
ciently detailed books and records are prerequisites to the appropriate
disclosure of remuneration information."'' This tautology is reinforced
by section 102 of the FCPA.11 Although the FCPA is generally limited to
certain illegal foreign payments, section 102 amended section 13(b)(2) of
the '34 Act and applies to any issuer within the SEC's jurisdiction."' The
amendments have been characterized as "the most extensive application
of federal law into corporate affairs since the enactment of the '33 and '34
Acts.""' Under the amendments, registrants are required to do the follow-
ing:
(A) make and keep books, records and accounts, which, in rea-
sonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and
dispositions of the assets of the issuer; and
(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls
sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with manage-
ment's general or specific authorization;
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit
preparation of financial statements in conformity with gener-
ally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria appl-
icable to such statements, and (II) to maintain accountabil-
ity for assets;
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with
management's general or specific authorization; and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with
", Ernst & Ernst, Executive Perquisites (1977); Price Waterhouse & Co., The Audit
Committee-A Working Guide For Audit Committee Members (1976). See also Coopers &
Lybrand, Audit Committee Guide (2d ed. 1976).
III See text accompanying notes 22-38 supra.
222 Interpretive Release, supra note 6, 23,019A at 17,059-8.
"3 Pub. L. No. 95-213, Title I, § 102, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78m(b)(2), (3)(A), (B).
"' See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
"5 Levenson, N.Y.L.J. Seminar, The Foreign Corrupt Practice Act of 1977, as reported
in 451 SEC. REG. L. REP. (BNA) D-1 (May 3, 1978). See generally von Mehren, supra note
40, at 81; Weiss, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977; Levenson & Gleason, The Accounting
and Record Keeping Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, in PLI, TENTH ANNUAL
INsTrrTUTE ON SEcUtrrms REGULATION 93, 103 (1978).
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the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate
action is taken with respect to any differences. " 6
The requirements are not stated in terms of materiality and are not
limited by traditional materiality concepts. Moreover, the four objectives
for internal accounting controls were drawn from professional auditing
literature and were not intended by accountants to constitute legal stan-
dards. In the final analysis, the amendments may be too ambiguous to
withstand legal challenge." 7
The controls which are needed to provide the "reasonable assurances"
mandated by the FCPA are uncertain. An AICPA advisory committee has
published a tentative report concerning internal accounting controls which
provides criteria to help registrants and outside accountants determine
whether corporate controls provide such assurances."' The criteria include
a cost-benefit analysis. Since outside auditors customarily submit an an-
nual report on internal controls to the board of directors or to a committee
of the board such as the audit committee, auditors should be requested
specifically to state that the controls are adequate to provide the
"reasonable assurances" required by the FCPA.
E. The Releases
A large number of items may be deemed remunerative under the var-
ious releases and therefore reportable, depending upon the circumstances
under which they are provided."9 The Perquisites Release states that all
payments made by a company which are not directly related to job per-
formance are forms of remuneration which should be reported. 20 However,
certain incidental benefits which are ordinary and necessary to the conduct
of company business, such as ordinary business lunches, and incidental
payments made by a company for items which are directly related to the
performance of management's functions, such as parking places, may not
"I Pub. L. No. 95-213, Title I, § 102, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78m(b)(2), (3)(A), (B)) (emphasis added).
M Cf. Peat. Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Executive Newsletter, Vol. IV, No. 2 (Feb. 23,
1978).
I' See AICPA, Tentative Report of the Special Advisory Committee on Internal Ac-
counting Control (September 15, 1978).
M See Perquisites Release, supra note 1, 23,019 at 17,059-4 to 17,059-7. Under the
SEC's policies, the following items may be deemed to constitute perquisites and therefore
disclosable as remuneration, depending upon the circumstances under which they are pro-
vided: automobiles, limousines, off hours transportation costs, supper money, entertainment
allowance, use of company airplane; personal travel during business trip, vacation during
business trip, travel allowance (e.g., per diem), foreign conventions, cafeteria subsidy and
private dining rooms, lunch clubs, country clubs, hotel suites, apartments, condominiums,
hunting lodges, vacation homes, etc., tickets to social functions and sports events, physical
examinations, athletic facilities (on and off premises), staff at home (permanent or tempo-
rary), home repairs; security systems, educational reimbursement, professional dues and
subscriptions, financial and other professional counseling, employee discounts, low interest
loans from company, and low interest loans from financial institutions. Id. at 17,059-5 to
17,059-6.
- Id. at 17,059-3.
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be reportable forms of remuneration.''
The Perquisites Release recognizes that management is usually in the
best position to determine whether a benefit constitutes remuneration.'2
In some circumstances, however, the determination should be made by the
audit committee. The determination will depend upon the facts and cir-
cumstances involved. The examples set forth in the Interpretive Release'2
are subject to refinement depending upon the factual settings involved.
However, any benefits received by management which are directly related
to job performance are not required to be included in aggregate remunera-
tion. In general, a personal benefit reportable as remuneration is some-
thing which is unrelated to the business of the company and which re-
lieves an individual of some personal expenditure.21 For example, bene-
fits which are provided to officers' and directors' relatives and friends
who do not perform any services for the corporation would be considered
remuneration to the officer or director.'1
If an incidental job-related benefit is ordinary and necessary to the
conduct of the company's business, is generally available to management
employees, does not relieve an individual of expenditures which are nor-
mally considered to be personal in nature, and is utilized "solely for the
purpose of attracting and maintaining qualified personnel, facilitating
their conduct of company business or improving their efficiency in job
performance," the benefit normally would not be considered remunera-
tion. 21 Instruction 2(d) to amended Item 4(a) of Regulation S-K'1 provides
some further guidance, stating that those benefits which are provided to
"broad categories of employees and which do not discriminate in favor of
officers or directors" need not be included in remuneration.'12
The SEC considers six specific categories of benefits to be reportable
as remuneration:
(1) home repairs and improvements; (2) housing and other
living expenses (including domestic service) provided at principal
and/or vacation residences of management pesonnel; (3) the per-
sonal use of company property such as automobiles, planes,
yachts, apartments, hunting lodges or company vacation houses;
(4) personal travel expenses; (5) personal entertainment and re-
lated expenses; and (6) legal, accounting and other professional
fees for matters unrelated to the business of the registrant. 9
Other forms of remuneration include the use of corporate staff for personal
121 Id.
' Id. at 17,059-6.
'" See Interpretive Release, supra note 6, 23,019A at 17,059-11 to 17,059-16.
121 Id. Questions 5, 17 & 18 at 17,059-10, 17,059-11.
12 Id. Question 5 at 17,059-10.
128 Perquisites Release, supra note 1, 23,019 at 17,059-6.
' 43 Fed. Reg. 58,181 (1978), reprinted in 4 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 70,962 at 61,705
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.20 Item 4(a), Instruction 2(d)).
"" Id.; see Remuneration Release, supra note 13, 81,765 at 81,081.
121 Perquisites Release, supra note 1, 23,019 at 17,059-5 to 17,059-6; see note 119 lupra.
[Vol. XXXVI
purposes and management's ability to obtain favorable bank loans or other
benefits because the corporation directly or indirectly compensates a bank
or third parties for providing the loans or other services. 110 In some cases,
an item may relate to the performance of business functions and also
relieve an individual of some personal expenditure, thereby constituting
remuneration for disclosure purposes.' If neither purpose predominates,
some allocation to the extent reasonably possible may be necessary.'
The value of all forms of remuneration must be included under the
appropriate disclosure item. Where cash is utilized, valuation and inclu-
sion in the remuneration table present no problem. In this regard, it is
important to note that personal benefits need not be separately described
when their value is included in the remuneration table.11 However, the
value of perquisites and certain other items must now be disclosed in
column (C2) of the remuneration table, separately from salaries, fees, com-
missions,and bonuses set forth in column (Cl).13u In addition, if a benefit
is required to be disclosed under another reporting provision, such as in-
debtedness under Item 4(e) of Regulation S-K,11 the benefit must also be
described under the other reporting provision." 6
The Remuneration Release states that personal benefits are to be val-
ued on the basis of their incremental cost to the company and reported in
column (C2) of the remuneration table. 37 When personal benefits included
in the table represent 10% of a individual's renumeration or $25,000,
whichever is less, Instruction 2(d)(iii) to revised Item 4(a) requires disclo-
sure in a footnote of the amount and a brief description of such benefits. 1'
Instruction 2(d)(i) states that when the amount which a recipient would
have paid for comparable benefits is significantly greater than the com-
pany's incremental cost of providing those benefits, a footnote describing
the benefits and their value to the recipient is required."9 Similarly, the
portion of the Remuneration Release which describes the amendments to
Item 4(a) states that if perquisites "comprise a significant component of
the remuneration of a given individual, or the management group, inclu-
sion of dollar amounts that represent a nominal incremental cost to a
registrant, without further explanation, may not provide shareholders with
" Perquisites Release, supra note 1, 23,019 at 17,059-6; seeInterpretive Release, supra
note 6, 23,019A, Questions 38 & 39 at 17,059-14 to 17,059-15.
" Interpretive Release, supra note 6, 23,019A at 17,059-8.
232 Id.
1:3 Id. Question 8 at 17,059-10.
" Remuneration Release, supra note 13, 81,765 at 81,080-82.
'3 43 Fed. Reg. 58,181 (1978), reprinted in 4 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 70,962 at 61,708-
09 .(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.20 Item 4(e)). Item 4(e) was formerly Item 7(e) of
Schedule 14A and Item 18(b) of Form 10-K.
lu See Interpretive Release, supra note 6, 23,019A Question 8 at 17,059-10.
I" Remuneration Release, supra note 13, 81,765 at 81,081.
238 43 Fed. Reg. 58,181 (1978), reprinted in 4 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 70,962 at 61,705
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.20 Item 4(a), Instruction 2(d)(iii)).
'' Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 220.20 Item 4(a), Instruction 2(d)(i)); see Remunera-
tion Release, supra note 13, 81,765 at 81,081.
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complete information regarding the level of management remuneration."'40
Thus, apparently no footnote is required when the value of benefits is not
material in relation to a recipient's salary.
In addition, if the specific amount of personal benefits, or the extent
to which benefits are personal rather than business, cannot be determined
without unreasonable effort or expense, such benefits may be omitted from
the remuneration table if after reasonable inquiry the company concludes
that personal benefits do not exceed $10,000 for each person, or for each
person in a group, and the omission of the information will not render the
remuneration table materially misleading.' However, a registrant's ina-
bility to identify large amounts of benefits may raise questions under the
FCPA."2
Ill. CONCLUSION
The SEC realizes that outside directors cannot take part in the day-
to-day management of a corporation or in the implementation of corporate
policies."' It is clear from the Sterling Homex Report and the SEC's com-
plaint in Shiell,"' however, that at a minimum a board is expected to
participate in major corporate decisions and to keep well informed of cor-
porate activities. The board is also expected to update existing corporate
policies and to adopt such new policies as may be necessary to comply with
statutory and SEC mandates, and then to monitor compliance with those
policies.
The board's monitoring task can be eased significantly by the use of
committees to advise it on various matters. In the perquisites area, the
audit committee or a committee with comparable functions is particularly
suited to establishing a perquisites control and reporting program and to
monitoring its progress."' The SEC appears to expect as part of that pro-
gram, procedures by which independent auditors review management re-
muneration, including perquisites, and report the results of their review to
the audit committee.
4 6
"' Remuneration Release, supra note 13, 81,765 at 81,081.
43 Fed. Reg. 58,181 (1978), reprinted in 4 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 70,962 at 61,705
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.20 Item 4(a), Instruction 2(d)(ii)), Remuneration Release,
supra note 13, 81,765 at 81,082. The proposed amendments to Item 4(a) set forth in the
Proposed Amendments Release required the board of directors or an appropriate committee
of the board to conclude that the applicable conditions for exclusion were satisfied and that
the information set forth in the table was not materially misleading. See Proposed A mend-
ments Release, supra note 10, 81,650 at 80,627. This requirement subsequently was deleted
due to the SEC's view that officers and directors are responsible for the adequacy and accu-
racy of disclosures in proxy statements and other documents. Remuneration Release, supra
note 13, 81,765 at 81,082.
"I Proposed Amendments Release, supra note 10, 81,650 at 80,627 n.8; see text accom-
panying note 40 supra.
" See text accompanying note 77 supra.
'" See text accompanying notes 80-94 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 95-111 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 102-04 supra.
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The full board of directors cannot possibly cope with all aspects of an
increasingly complex corporate structure. Moreover corporate governance
will no doubt become even more complicated in coming years as Congress
and the SEC require greater shareholder participation in corporate
decision-making and more extensive disclosure of information once
thought to be immaterial. Although a board cannot rely absolutely and
unquestioningly upon committees,"7 it can be expected that the use of
committees will greatly expand in the future. The explicit approval by the
SEC of delegating to the audit committee the basic responsibility for es-
tablishing and monitoring a perquisites program 4' may be a harbinger of
a trend in which committees will be expected to play an ever-increasing
role in governing publicly held corporations."'
IV See Sterling Homex Report, supra note 80, 80,219 at 85,460, 85,462-63.
1' See text accompanying note 102 supra.
HI Subsequent to the completion of this article, a very useful article was published
addressing the legislative history and mechanics of the FCPA. See A Report by the Comm.
on Corporate Law and Accounting, A Guide to the New Section 13(b)(2) Accounting Require-
ments of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Section 102 of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act of 1977), 34 Bus. LAw. 307 (1978). In addition, the SEC has published final rules to
implement the provisions of the FCPA. SEC Release No. 34-15570, 44 Fed. Reg. 10,964 (Feb.
23, 1979), reprinted in [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 81,959. The rules are extremely
broad and have already elicited considerable comment. See, e.g., Queenan & Brownlee,
Section 13(b) Accounting Standards, 12 Rav. SEc. REG. 961 (1979). In the release promulgat-
ing the new rules, SEC Commissioner Karmel separately stated that she was opposed to the
decision to promulgate the rules as drafted. SEC Release No. 34-15570, [Current] FED. SEc.
L. REP. (CCH) 81,959 at 81,401.
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